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Reputation-based trust models using statistical learning have been intensively studied for dis-
tributed systems where peers behave maliciously. However practical applications of such models
in environments with both malicious and rational behaviors are still very little understood. This
paper studies the relation between accuracy of such computational learning models and their abil-
ity to effectively enforce cooperation among rational agents as a result of their game-theoretic
properties. We provide theoretical results that show under which conditions cooperation emerges
when using trust learning algorithms with given accuracy and how cooperation can be still sus-
tained while reducing cost and accuracy of those algorithms.
Specifically, we use a computational trust model as a dishonesty detector to filter out unfair rat-
ings and proved that such model with reasonable false positives and false negatives can effectively
build trust and cooperation in the system, assuming the rationality of participants. These results
reveal two interesting observations: first, the key to the success of a reputation system in rational
environment is not a particular sophisticated learning mechanism but an effective identity man-
agement scheme to prevent whitewashing behaviors. Second, in heterogeneous environment where
peers use different learning algorithms with certain accuracy to learn trustworthiness of their
potential partners, cooperation may also emerge. In other words, different computation trust
models produce the same effects on rational participants in enforcing cooperation and building
trust among them.
We verify and extend these theoretical results to a variety of settings involving honest, malicious
and strategic players through extensive simulation. These results will enable a much more targeted,
cost-effective and realistic design for decentralized trust management systems, such as needed for
peer-to-peer, electronic commerce or community systems.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.4.0 [Information Systems Applications]: General; I.2.11 [Distributed
Artificial Intelligence]: Intelligent agents; Multiagent systems; I.6.3 [Simulation and Modeling]: Applications
General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Design, Experimentation
Additional KeyWords and Phrases: trust, reputation, learning, rationality, incentive-compatibility
1. INTRODUCTION
Reputation information has long been shown as an effective tool to enforce cooperation
and build trust among participants in a variety of e-commerce systems and online forums
such as eBay1, Yahoo Auction2, or Slashdot3.
Researches on the effectiveness and application of reputation information in open and
1http://www.ebay.com
2http://auctions.yahoo.com/
3http://www.slashdot.com/
1
2 ·
decentralized environments have also attracted substantial efforts recent years. Depend-
ing on the way reputation information is used, current work in the area can be classified
into two solution classes [Dellarocas 2005b]: the first includes those computational trust
models that learn peers’ behavior based on their historical performance, e.g., whether and
to which extent a peer provide high quality services and gives reliable recommendation
on the others. Work in this class mainly exploits the signaling role of reputation: peer
learns participants’ behavior types from reputation information as a form of social knowl-
edge. The second category of solution comprises those game-theoretical approaches that
use reputation as a sanctioning tool to enforce cooperation and establish trust among par-
ticipants, e.g., by penalizing bad peers and praising good ones. The system is designed
as a game whose structure ensures that being cooperative is the dominant strategy of all
rational peers who want to maximize their life-time expected utilities. Interested readers
can refer to existing surveys [Golbeck 2006; Jøsang et al. 2005; Despotovic and Aberer
2006; Dellarocas 2005b] for systematic reviews on the area based on various viewpoints.
Computational trust models propose appropriate statistical or ad hoc heuristic methods
to aggregate ratings on past transactions of a peer and related participants, from which
to compute a trust metric as indication of a target’s trustworthiness. The main principle of
such models is to learn and predict the future behaviors of peers by examining their past be-
havioral patterns, assuming such behaviors follow certain probabilistic models, e.g., peers
behaving good in the past are likely to continue doing so in next transactions. For exam-
ple, a learning peer can estimate the reliability of another as proportional to the similarity
between its own experience with ratings reported by the latter [Xiong and Liu 2004]. The
EigenTrust model [Kamvar et al. 2003] assigns a unique global trust value to each peer as
the PageRank-like value of that peer in a network of individual agents giving recommenda-
tions among one another. Alternatively, a peer may assume behaviors of a target to follow
a certain probabilistic model, thus it evaluates trustworthiness of the target as the posterior
probability the latter provides good services, using ratings from the others as evidences to
update the original probabilities [Whitby et al. 2005; Patel et al. 2005]. Such computational
methods are designed to be resilient against malicious peers who want to take the system
down at any cost by many types of strategic attacks, e.g., by submitting biased ratings to
confuse the system and to make it less accurate in learning peers’ behaviors.
On one hand, computational trust models have been intensively studied and demon-
strated to be robust under various (strategic) attacks by malicious peers, e.g., ballot-stuffing,
badmouthing, or collusion among many participants. In fact, statistical learning models
and appropriate heuristics can effectively filter out biased information to obtain a correct
picture of the peer’s historical quality, as empirical evidences have shown [Despotovic
2005; Anceaume and Ravoaja 2006; Sun et al. 2006]. On the other hand, current compu-
tational trust models strongly assume the probabilistic nature of all participants, ignoring
the fact that many of them have economic incentives and behave rationally.
In the presence of rationally opportunistic (or selfish) peers, who are neither dishonest
nor cooperative but change their behaviors strategically to maximize expected life-time
utilities, it is still unclear how well a computational trust model can enforce cooperation in
the system. As a typical example, strategic peers can first cooperate to build reputation and
then start cheating to increase their life-time utilities. Although some simulations [Liang
and Shi 2007; Schlosser et al. 2005] suggest that these algorithms may also enforce co-
operation in presence of both rational and malicious behaviors, no theoretical analysis has
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been performed to justify this.
Game-theoretical trust management approaches of the second solution class mainly deal
with rationally opportunistic participants, who have full knowledge of the solution model
being deployed and behave strategically to maximize their life-time utilities. Promising
solutions include giving monetary incentives to peers to motivate their good service pro-
visioning and truthfully reporting behaviors [Jurca and Faltings 2006; Miller et al. 2005],
or by using reputation as a effective sanctioning tool: peers with lower reputation are less
likely to be selected, as in [Dellarocas 2005a]. However, these solutions usually rely on
many assumptions: peers having specific utility functions, being fully rational with unlim-
ited computational power to find complex equilibriums of the designed mechanism. More
importantly, such solutions do not consider malicious behaviors of attackers.
Since both rationally opportunistic and malicious behaviors can be present in real en-
vironments, an effective reputation management approach to minimize influences of these
unwanted behaviors is of paramount importance. A natural question is how we can exploit
well-tested and accurate computational trust models to effectively establish trust among
partners in environments where peers may exhibit various behaviors, including honest,
malicious, and rationally opportunistic. We want to know whether and under which con-
ditions, computational trust models that are resilient against malicious attackers can also
be used in a incentive-compatible way to motivate cooperation of rationally opportunistic
players. As the main performance criteria of such models are their statistical accuracy in
detecting malicious behaviors, it is our interest to study the relation between such statisti-
cal accuracy measures and their ability to enforce cooperation among peers and discourage
their selfish behaviors.
Another question is related to the optimized usage of computational trust models, as
such methods are costly to deploy and maintain. To effectively learn of bad behaviors and
minimize their influences, various cost is incurred to retrieve recommendations, filter out
biased information, evaluate and update reputation scores of peers [Liang and Shi 2007],
etc. In fact, given the rationality of peers, it may be unnecessary to always use accurate yet
costly learning algorithms to encourage truthful behaviors. The reason is rationally selfish
peers make use of their knowledge about the deployed algorithm(s) to avoid having bad
reputation and maintain their high benefits from the system. Being aware of the existence
of such learning algorithms to reliably detect bad behaviors, peers have little incentives
to cheat and thus expensive learning can be avoided. Consequently, accurate yet costly
trust learning mechanisms should only be used as an inspection tool to detect past cheating
behaviors, in order to punish bad agents appropriately, e.g., by not selecting them for later
transactions. Such punishment meted out to peers found cheating can be used to provide
sufficient incentives for cooperation of peers. Exploiting this fact, we want to minimize the
cost of using expensive computational trust models in environments where most peers are
rational. A solution to this question implies many benefits for various applications, e.g.,
where peers have limited resources and quick decisions are generally preferred to avoid
missing opportunities, especially in competitive scenarios.
In this paper, we propose and analyze a simple but effective way of using a computa-
tional trust model to minimize influence of malicious peers and at the same time, keep
rational peers being cooperative during most of their transactions. Specifically, we pro-
pose a peer selection mechanism that consists of two steps. First, we use a computational
trust model to estimate the reliability of the most recent rating on a peer, based on the
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rating’s credibility of the rater and the trustworthiness of the peer being evaluated. Well-
experimented computational trust models, e.g., [Xiong and Liu 2004; Patel et al. 2005] can
be used to identify malicious rating behaviors with high accuracy in this step. The result
of the learning is then used to decide whether to include the target peer for selection or
to ignore/blacklist the peer being rated. Such selection approach can be applied easily in
various open e-markets or online communities with different degree of centralization. Our
theoretical analysis and extensive simulation to analyze the efficiency of this peer selection
protocol under various scenarios provide the following results and contributions:
• sufficient conditions on statistical accuracies of a trust learning algorithm to en-
force cooperation: we prove that if statistical accuracy measures of the chosen learn-
ing algorithm in the first step are good enough, rational peers find it most beneficial
to cooperate in all but some of their last transactions. These conditions also show
that in rational environments, even simple and naive algorithms may lead to a good
social outcome with high cooperation level in the system. According to extensive sim-
ulations, such results are still applicable if peers join and leave dynamically, provided
most of them stay long enough. In such environments the key to enforcing cooperation
is the effectiveness of the identity management scheme to effectively prevent white-
washing behaviors, rather than the computational trust learning algorithm being used.
By showing that there exist certain sufficient conditions so that a computational trust
model can be used effective in boosting cooperation, we provide an initial positive
answer to the question whether existing trust learning algorithms in the literature pro-
duce the same effect: inducing the social optimum point in the system where rational
participants fully cooperate with each other. This also implies that in a heterogeneous
environment where peers use different learning algorithms with certain accuracy to
learn trustworthiness of their potential partners, cooperation may also emerge.
• a cost-efficient reputation management approach: we propose a way to best com-
bine existing trust learning algorithms to maximize cooperation in the system, while
minimizing cost, if there are alternative computational trust models with cost/accuracy
trade-off among them. Inspired by a inspection game-theoretic approach [Avenhaus
et al. 2002], we prove that during the step of evaluating rating reliability, it is sufficient
to use an accurate (and expensive) algorithm with a low probability while still main-
taining high cooperation in the system. As a result, we reduce the total implementation
cost of the whole selection protocol significantly.
In a larger extent, our presented selection protocol establishes an umbrella framework
to use reputation information effectively in decentralized and self-organized systems by
exploiting both its signaling and sanctioning roles [Dellarocas 2005a].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work studying the relation between accu-
racy of a trust learning model and its ability in enforcing cooperation in open environments,
as well as analyzing the tradeoff between the cost of a computational trust mechanism
and the additional benefits achieved by using it. The most related work is by Dellaro-
cas [Dellarocas 2005a] that studies some design parameters of a reputation system and its
effectiveness. However, this work does not include the analysis of influences of malicious
behaviors and the optimization of the cost of the reputation mechanism being deployed.
Our work analyzes the impacts of these factors, comprises extensive simulations on a va-
riety of scenarios, and is also applicable for any open systems with different degree of
centralization.
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Section 2 of this paper gives a formal definition of our system model. In Section 3
we study the relation between accuracy of a computational trust model and its incentive-
compatibility with a detailed theoretical analysis. We then propose a way to combine dif-
ferent trust models to minimize their usage cost while retaining their efficiency in enforcing
cooperation among rational participants in Section 4. Section 5 proposes an approximate
approach to use computational trust models in scenarios with peers joining and leaving
dynamically overtime. Our simulation and experimental results are presented in Section 6.
We summarize related work in Section 7 before giving some discussions and concluding
the paper in Section 8.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Scenario and Assumptions
Consider a P2P application where each participant plays the role of a seller (provider) or
a buyer (client) of certain resources (a sellable good item or a service) with certain prices
and quality. Denote P the set of all peers and W : P × P → Df the social relationship
among them, where Df is the domain to represent the relationship values between two
peers. For example, Df may represent the relationship type between two friends in a social
network (famlily/close/normal/stranger) or the weight of an edge between two nodes in a
trust network4.
The set of outcomes of a transaction between peers isO. In this work, we considerO as
a binary set corresponding to a bad or a good outcome, yet this can be generalized to any
set with a total ordering among the elements.
A peer provides a resource with value u for its clients, where u lies within a range of
minimal price u∗ and maximal price u∗. Thus we name u the “legal” payoff of a peer in a
transaction if he or she behaves honestly in providing a resource and yields a good trans-
action outcome. Example honest behavior is to ship the item to the buyer after receiving
payment, or to provide a good service to the client. If the provider peer cheats, e.g., doesn’t
ship the good or provides the low-quality services, it gains a further “illegitimate” amount
v, where 0 ≤ v ≤ v∗ <∞. For example, in an e-trading system, this v can be the shipping
cost plus the value of the item as evaluated by the seller. In this case, the transaction is
considered having a bad outcome.
Denote T (x, y, t) a transaction between two peers x ∈ P, y ∈ P , where x is the buyer
(a client) of the resource, y is the seller (the server or the provider), and t ∈ Ω is the
timestamp of the transaction. For convenience, let Ts(y) = {T (x, y, t) | x ∈ P, t ∈ Ω}
be the set of all transactions with y as the seller of the resource (or server). Similarly,
Tc(x) = {T (x, y, t) | y ∈ P, t ∈ Ω} is the set of all transactions where the peer x plays
the role of the buyer.
We use rs(x, y, tr) to represent a rating from a peer x on another peer y on a transaction
tr ∈ T (y). Generally, peers may also need to rate the reliability of a rating, e.g., a seller
reports that a certain rating on one of the transaction is unfair. We use another notation
rr(x, y, r) for represent the rating of a peer x on a specific rating r made by y. The value
of a rating rs(x, y, tr) or rr(x, y, r) belongs to the outcome domain O.
Our goal is to maintain a high level of cooperation in our decentralized application en-
vironment: all providers/sellers mostly behave honestly, and clients/buyers are motivated
4http://trust.mindswap.org/
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to leave truthful (reliable) ratings after their transactions.
Whereas the problem of trust and cooperation is ubiquitous and may be present cross
all layers of the system, in this paper we focus on the cooperation among participants in
the application layer. We assume the existence of a (decentralized) storage system that
supports efficient search for resources, ratings, and related information on participants.
Such storage system should ensure that advertisements of provided services, published
ratings, and transaction information are authentic and can not be tampered with. That is,
peers can neither fake transactions nor modify feedback data submitted by others. These
goals can be met by using a DHT-based storage [Aberer et al. 2003] and cryptographic
tools such as digital signatures based on a decentralized PKI infrastructure [Datta et al.
2003].
We also assume that peers typically know the lower bound of prices of a service (or a
resource) u∗ and they can estimate the gain v of a bad provider peer after each transaction,
for example, in eBay-like environment, is the shipping cost plus the item value. Such an
assumption is realistic: a centralized system can define those values u∗ for each category
of services or items, or peers can learn these values by looking at trading history of other
peers in the system.
The final assumptions are that peers are generally long-term players and stay in the
system infinitely, or at least, long-enough. This assumption can be relaxed under certain
circumstances, e.g., in centralized environments where it is possible to impose an entrant
fee for a newly joined peer.
The above environment is an abstraction of many practical P2P application scenarios
with different degrees of centralization, where participants are rational to a certain extent.
Such scenario can represent, for example, a centralized eBay-like trading environment, a
social-network based system for selling and buying goods, or a decentralized markets of
services [Papazoglou and Georgakopoulos 2003; Buyya et al. 2001]. Consequently, our
proposed solution can be used in all these applications. Similarly, the assumptions above
to simplify our analysis are also well-accepted ones in the trust-related research literature
for analyzing peer’s behaviors [Despotovic 2005].
2.2 Example Application
Given the above general notations, we introduce the following running example to illustrate
different concepts and results of our work. We consider a decentralized (also called a C2C
or peer-to-peer) market of goods, where each participant can be seller and/or buyer of
certain good items. As a concrete example, any person in the Internet can advertise and
sell their items in a peer-to-peer system and/or an online social network like Facebook5 or
MySpace6. Another realistic showcase of this is the recent launch of Neighborhoods7 that
enables eBay users to do shopping via their social networks.
In such C2C trading scenario, buyers can search and buy available items that match
their needs and interests. As a common rule, a buyer has to pay for the item first. Only
after receiving the payment, the seller decides to ship or not to ship the item to the buyer. If
the seller cheats (doesn’t ship the good or provides the low-quality item), it gains a further
amount v, where 0 ≤ v ≤ v∗ <∞. This value v can be the shipping cost plus the value of
5http://www.facebook.com
6http://www.myspace.com
7http://neighborhoods.ebay.com
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the item as evaluated by the seller.
The traditional way to enforce the cooperation of the seller via reputation mechanism
is to allow a buyer to rate a seller as honest or cheating after finishing a transaction with
him [Resnick et al. 2000]. Other buyers can search for available recommendations or rat-
ings on the seller and decide whether they should go into transaction with this seller. In
this case, a computational mechanism to effectively eliminate unreliable ratings in order to
minimize influences of malicious rating users are strongly required. Other incentive mech-
anism to elicit sufficient truthful reports from buyers for such computational mechanism
or trust learning algorithm are also necessary. Note that we do not consider certain auction
schemes that can also be deployed for selection of an appropriate buyer, yet this issue is
orthogonal to our concerns and thus outside the scope of the paper.
For brevity and readability reason, we use the notion of a buyer, a seller, or a good item
to illustrate our concepts. These notations also mean, respective, to a service provider, a
client, or a service offered by a peer in other application scenarios.
2.3 Computational Trust Models as Dishonesty Detectors
A computational trust model relies on various statistical or heuristic methods to learn be-
havior of a peer (the target) based on various information sources. The first is the perfor-
mance statistics of the target in past transactions, both via recommendations/ratings from
previous partners and via personal experience of the learning peer on the target. Other in-
formation includes intrinsic features of the target itself, e.g., frequencies of posted ratings
and involved transactions, location of the raters [Cornelli et al. 2002], relationships with
other peers in the systems [Ashri et al. 2005]. The behaviors that can be learned from
such information include both serving and rating behavior of any peer in the system. The
former represents the likelihood that the peer offers a high quality resource to its clients,
e.g., whether a seller ships the item to buyer after receiving the payment. The latter means
the trustworthiness of the peer in rating a transaction, that is, whether the peer truthfully
reports its experience.
In this paper, we use a computational trust model as a dishonesty detector to effectively
evaluate the trustworthiness (or reliability) of a rating, similar to a conventional spam de-
tector in machine learning literature. From this perspective, we can formally model such
mechanism as in Definition 2.1 (see Section 2.1 for defined concepts).
Definition 2.1. A reputation-based and possibly personalized computational trust model
used by a peer i to estimate the trustworthiness of the rating by another peer j is a 5-tuple
R = 〈Pi, Vi,Fj , A,D〉 where:
• Pi ⊆ P is a set of peers that i considered relevant to the evaluation of j’s rating
reliability.
• Vi ⊆ {rs(x, y, v) | x ∈ Pi ∧ y ∈ Pi}∪ {rr(x, y, v) | x ∈ Pi ∧ y ∈ Pi} is subset of all
ratings related to peers in Pi.
• Fj is a set of properties of the target peer j, for instance, its location, frequencies of
posted ratings, number of involved transactions, etc.
• A is a function that operates on Pi,W, Vi,Fj and outputs a trust value Tij . The value
Tij is understood as the trustworthiness of j in rating. Tij may take binary, real, or
discrete values.
• D is a set of decision rules with binary outcome stating whether i should trust j given
the (personalized) trust metric Tij .
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Definition 2.1 is the formal description of several (if not most) well-known heuristic or
statistical trust evaluation algorithms in the literature. This formal model includes all ap-
proaches studying trust on peer to peer systems [Despotovic and Aberer 2006], on social
networks [Golbeck 2006], in e-commerce systems, and on other online communities [Del-
larocas 2005b; Jøsang et al. 2005].
The set of relevant peers and related ratings Pi and Vi constitutes the actual feedback
retrieval mechanism of the computational trust model and contributes the main cost of the
mechanism, as we will explain later on. To illustrate the expressiveness of the formal model
in Definition 2.1, Example 2.2 specifies the well-known heuristic trust learning proposed
by [Xiong and Liu 2004].
Example 2.2. The personalized trust model PeerTrust [Xiong and Liu 2004] can be
seen as a tool to evaluate rating reliability via the following formal modeling:
• Pi = {i, j} ∪ {k | k ∈ Ts(i) ∧ Ts(j)}. In other words, the set of relevant peers Pi
includes are i, j and those peers having interactions with both of them.
• Vi = {rs(x, y, v) | x ∈ {i, j}, y ∈ Pi}, that is, Vi consists of those ratings by i and j
on serving behaviors of other peers k in the relevant peer set Pi.
• the relationship W among peers and the features of the target Fj are not considered.
• Tij = 1 −
√∑
k∈Pi d
2[rs(i,k,v),rs(j,k,v)]
‖Pi‖ , where d[u, v] is the difference between two
ratings by i and j, which can be measured as the Euclidean distance between their
respective rating values rs(i, k, v) and rs(j, k, v).
• The ratings by j are considered as reliable if Tij > Tmin and as unreliable otherwise,
where Tmin is a system design parameter.
Example 2.3. Another approach to estimate peer’s trustworthiness is to assume peers
to behave according to a probabilistic model [Despotovic and Aberer 2004]. From the
viewpoint of the learning peer i, each target peer j has a probability Tij of reporting
truthfully what its observes. This model is specified similar to Example 2.2, except the
definition of Tij and the decision rule Di to estimate rating reliability. We formally define:
Tij =
∑
k∈Pi I(rs(i, k, v) = rs(j, k, v))
‖{rs(i, k, v) | k ∈ Pi}‖ (1)
where the function I(c) evaluates to 1 if the boolean condition c is true. Thus Tij is
defined by the fraction of ratings by j having the same values as ratings by i. This Tij
is an estimate of the probability the peer j being honest when rating, and such estimate
maximize the likelihood of having the observation set Vi by the set of relevant peers Pi.
In this case, the decision rule Di to estimate rating reliability is to trust the rating with
probability Tij .
Other computational trust models can be represented similarly. Global trust metrics like
EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] and complaint-based algorithm [Aberer and Despotovic
2001] consider all peers in the networks, thus Pi = P , and consider the recommenda-
tion/ratings among each pair of them.
Considering a computational trust model as a dishonesty detector, we define its statistical
accuracy measures similar to those of a conventional spam detector in machine learning
literature (Definition 2.4).
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Definition 2.4. The accuracy of a computational trust model R formulated in Defini-
tion 2.1 in estimating the reliability of a rating is defined by its two misclassification errors,
α and β, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the probability that R misclassifies an unreliable rating as
reliable. Inversely, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the probability that a reliable rating wrongly classified
as an unreliable one. We refer to α and β respectively as false positive and false negative
errors henceforth.
The accuracy of a computational model also implies its resilience to possible malicious
attacks that manipulate ratings, by estimating the trustworthiness of a rating using the
combination of performance statistics of both the rater and the seller being considered to
estimate whether a rating is trustworthy.
2.4 Strategic Seller-Selection Protocol
We propose the following approach for a a rational buyer to select a seller among candi-
dates (Definition 2.5). Concrete implementation of this mechanism will be presented later
on in Section 5. Table I summarizes most frequently used notations in this section.
Definition 2.5. A buyer uses the following seller-selection protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉 to
evaluate the eligibility of a seller for its transactions:
(1) buyer gets the most recent binary rating r on the seller, considering the absence of a
rating as the presence of a positive one
(2) the binary reliability t of r is evaluated with the computational trust model R
(3) if t = + ∧ r = − or t = − ∧ r = +, buyer publishes this cheating detection to a
shared space
(4) the seller is included for selection if there are less than k ≥ 1 published cheating
detections on it, otherwise the buyer ignores it.
The above seller-selection protocol Sk is tough for bad players, including malicious and
rationally opportunistic sellers. It assures that a globally blacklisted seller has no further
chance to do transactions with other peers. The evaluation of rating reliability by a compu-
tational trust model in step (2) aims to reduce influences of strategic manipulation of ratings
by rational or malicious peers. The goal here is to eliminate as much malicious sellers as
possible when they start cheating and incentivize rationally opportunistic sellers to coop-
erate. Actually, the use of the above seller-selection protocol with a global computational
trust model mimics the behavior of a centralized reputation system in practice.
The parameter k ≥ 1 represents the cautiousness of a buyer in trusting cheating detec-
tions published by others and maybe different for each buyer. The incentives for sharing
the learning results are not much an issue: in case all buyers do not share the learning
results, a buyer can still do the learning by itself and our approach still holds if the eval-
uation of rating reliability is deterministic, e.g., R is a deterministic global computational
trust model. Generally the learning at step (2) is verifiable, e.g., in case of global compu-
tational trust models such as EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] or complaint-based [Aberer
and Despotovic 2001], writing wrong learning results is detectable and not an issue.
Thus the main problem is the badmouthing attack, when many peers collude to bad-
mouth a certain seller to eliminate it. To reduce the effect of this attack, a robust algorithm
R should consider using trustworthiness of both rater and the seller being rated to estimates
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Table I. Commonly used notations
Notation Definition
u∗ minimal price of offered items/resources/services, u∗ > 0
u∗ maximal price of offered items/resources/services u∗ ≤ u∗
u legal gain of seller when cooperating, u∗ ≤ u ≤ u∗
v additional gain of seller when cheating in a transaction, v > 0
v∗ maximal additional gain of seller by cheating, 0 ≤ v∗ <∞
α Pr(rating estimated as reliable | unreliable rating)
β Pr(rating estimated as unreliable | reliable rating)
k # of negative learning results posted on a seller
before globally blacklisting it
² upper-bound of α and β, 0 ≤ ² ≤ 1
∆ # of remaining transactions for which a rational seller
does not have incentives to cooperate, ∆ ∈ N
R a computational trust model to estimate reliability of a rating,
explained in details in Definition 2.1
N the naı¨ve computational model evaluating all ratings as reliable
Sk = 〈R, k〉 a seller-selection protocol specified in Definition 2.5
whether a rating is reliable. Anyway, the accidental blacklisting of a good peer is unharm
to a buyer and can be reduced by increasing k.
Note that in the designed seller-selection protocol, the actual computational trust models
being used and its settings may be private information of the learning. Only the theoret-
ically or experimentally-proved bound of the misclassification errors of these models are
shown to the participants in the system.
We consider the absence of a rating after a transaction as a positive one to reduce the
effect of having less ratings for making decisions. The incentives to leave truthful feed-
back after a transaction in the system is another issue we do not consider in details in
this work. In fact, it is possible to integrate existing incentive mechanisms, e.g., via side-
payment [Miller et al. 2005] into our system without any major efforts. Furthermore,
buyers have other indirect incentives to leave reliable ratings after transactions. First, such
behaviors help to eliminate bad sellers. Second, future sellers are motivated to cooperate
with honest reporting buyers as shown in a later analysis (Corollary 3.7), which also give
additional motivation for peers to leave truthful feed back.
3. INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY OF COMPUTATIONAL TRUST MODELS
In this section, we study the relation between the accuracy of a computational trust model
and its incentive-compatibility, that is, the possibility to effectively use a computational
model with reasonably good accuracy for boosting trust and cooperation in decentralized
environments.
3.1 Quantifying the Learning Accuracy
Misclassification errors of a given computational model depend on several factors, both en-
dogenous and exogenous. Endogenous factors come from the computational model itself,
most importantly are input-related factors (personal experience of the learning peer, col-
lected ratings) and algorithmic issues (underlying probabilistic model, feedback retrieving
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and aggregation strategies, etc.). Exogenous factors include behaviors of participants (ma-
licious, rationally opportunistic, or voluntarily cooperative) and system dynamics (such as
the volumes of transactions and participating levels over time).
Practically, a bound on computational model accuracy can be measured either experi-
mentally or via theoretical analysis. This question has already been extensively studied in
several previous work, namely [Levien 2002; Xiong and Liu 2004; Kamvar et al. 2003],
most of which having been shown to have low α, β under various attack scenarios. Such
studies confirm that the main factor influencing the errors α, β of a computational trust
model is the overall fraction of honest raters in the system.
Example 3.1. Consider the simple computational model N that uses a naively opti-
mistic algorithm: trust all ratings and consider the absence of a rating as a positive one.
We claim that misclassification errors of N are α = α0 = 1 and β = β0 = 0. In fact, let
0 ≤ δh, δl, δi ≤ 1, where δh + δl + δi = 1 be respectively the probabilities that the rating
peer provides a reliable rating, an unreliable one, and no rating after a transaction with a
specific seller at the time of estimate. There are two possibilities:
• the seller did cooperate in the last transaction, thus the absence of a rating can be con-
sidered a reliable positive rating. So α0 = Pr(est+, real−)/Pr(real−) = δl/δl = 1
and β0 = Pr(est−, real+)/Pr(real+) = 0/(δh + δi) = 0.
• the seller did not cooperate in last transaction, thus the absence of a rating is an
unreliable positive rating. Still, we have α0 = Pr(est+, real−)/Pr(real−) =
(δl + δi)/(δl + δi) = 1 and β0 = Pr(est−, real+)/Pr(real+) = 0/δh = 0.
In our work, we generally do not care about actual values of those errors α, β but only
their upper-bound ², and we are concerned with those computational models with accuracy
better than random guess, i.e., ² < 0.5. Several measurements on α, β of the computational
trust models mentioned in Examples 2.2 and 2.3 under different conditions also confirm
the accuracy of such mechanisms in learning the reliability of ratings (c.f. Section 6.4).
Our approach supposes that such bound of α, β of trust models being used is provided
to all peers in the system. Alternatively, these errors can also be learnt by participants
themselves. Although a proof for the existence of a trust model with low α, β is out of the
scope of the paper, an initial positive answer is available [Anceaume and Ravoaja 2006].
In practice, accurate learning with α, β upper-bounded by some ² < 0.5 is generally
possible in most application scenarios. For instance, an accurate yet expensive method to
estimate reliability of ratings by peer on a seller is to perform full monitoring on perfor-
mance of the seller to learn its real past behavior. Such monitoring can be implemented
in many ways: in an e-commerce system, monitoring is done via legal investigations on
suspicious transactions conducted. In a market of web services, one can deploy monitoring
agents to periodically probe and test the service being offered by a provider to estimate the
real offered quality level offered during last period by that provider.
3.2 Learning Accuracy and Incentive-compatibility
Suppose that sellers have a minimal legal gain u∗, maximal illegitimate cheating gain v∗,
and their possible strategies at each transaction are either cooperate or cheat. Given a
bound ² of α, β of computational trust model(s) being used by buyers in the system, The-
orem 3.2 shows the relation between the errors α, β of a computational trust model and its
effectiveness in enforcing cooperation of a seller during its life-time.
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THEOREM 3.2. The seller-selection protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉makes it optimal for a ratio-
nal seller to cooperate in all but its last ∆ transactions, where ∆ = max{1, bv∗/(u∗((1−
²)k−²k))c}. This hold even in presence of malicious and strategic manipulation of ratings
by sellers, provided that the trust modelR has misclassification errors α, β upper-bounded
by some ² < 0.5.
PROOF. Rational sellers apparently do not find incentives to cooperate in a last transac-
tion. Let us consider those rational sellers staying in the system for ∆ > 1 transactions
more after the current one.
Denote U the current (accumulative) utilities of a rational seller and uh its best (maxi-
mized) expected utilities for remaining time in the system if it is not globally blacklisted
after the current transaction. Since the fully cooperative strategy during ∆ ≥ 1 transac-
tions leads to a total utility of at least ∆u∗, it follows that uh ≥ ∆u∗ for any seller who
wants to be involved in at least ∆ further transactions.
Let 0 ≤ h, l, s, i ≤ 1 respectively be the probabilities that the current buyer exhibits one
of the following rating behaviors after the transaction: honest (provides reliable ratings),
advertising (posts positive ratings on the seller), badmouthing (rates the seller negatively),
and a non-participating user (does not leave any rating), where h+ l + s+ i = 1.
The probabilities that an honest seller obtains a positive or a negative rating after a
transaction are correspondingly h+ = h+ s+ i = 1− l and 1− h+. Thus the probability
that the seller will be blacklisted by a next buyer is: xb = h+β + (1 − h+)α = (1 −
l)β + lα ≤ ², since 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ ², 0 ≤ β ≤ ². The probability the
seller is globally blacklisted after the current transaction is then xkb ≤ ²k. This inequality
holds even in presence of malicious or strategic manipulation of ratings by sellers, making
h, l, s, i different for each learning, provided that misclassification errors α, β ofR are less
than ².
Similarly reasoning, if the seller is cheating in this transaction, the probability it obtains
a positive rating is l+ = s+ i = 1− h− l, with probability 1− l+ such a seller receives a
negative rating. In this case, the seller will be blacklisted by a future buyer with probability
yb = l+(1− α) + (1− l+)(1− β) = (1− h− l)(1− α) + (h+ l)(1− β) ≥ 1− ². Thus
the probability the seller is globally blacklisted is ykb ≥ (1− ²)k.
Let Uhonest (and Ucheat ) be the best (maximal) expected life-time utilities of the seller
if it is honest (respectively cheating) in the current transaction, it follows that:
Uhonest = U + u+ uh(1− xkb )
Ucheat = U + (u+ v) + uh(1− ykb )
δhc = Uhonest − Ucheat = −v + uh(ykb − xkb )
≥ −v∗ + uh((1− ²)k − ²k)
Since uh ≥ ∆u∗ > 0 and 0 ≤ ² < 0.5, the condition ∆ ≥ v∗/(u∗((1− ²)k − ²k)) > 0
implies δhc ≥ 0. Therefore, a rational seller considers cooperation as the dominant strategy
in any transaction except in its last max{1, bv∗/(u∗((1− ²)k − ²k))c} ones.
We can make use of the following observation in case we only know the illegitimate
gain v of a seller in a transaction, but not the maximal value v∗ (Proposition 3.3).
PROPOSITION 3.3. The seller-selection protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉 makes it optimal for
a rational seller to cooperate in the current transaction if the seller stays for further ∆
transactions, where ∆ = max{1, bv/(u∗((1− ²)k − ²k))c}.
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The above theoretical analysis also holds for the case peers use different computational
trust models with different inputs and personalized settings to evaluate the trustworthiness
of the last rater, and the probability of detecting a bad rater is different for each peer. In
those situations where there are certain (usually small) probabilities that an intrinsically
honest seller appears as cheating to a buyer, e.g., it fails to ship the item, and a cheating
seller satisfies the buyer, e.g., it sends a low-quality item yet still pleases the buyer. The
inclusion of such probabilities in the above analysis is straightforward.
According to Theorem 3.2, if the temporary gain v∗ is very high, such as the case of
selling of expensive items, the parameter ∆→∞, meaning that enforcing the cooperation
of a rational seller in such a transaction is impossible, which is an intuitive result. In other
cases, a relation between ∆ and the error upper-bound ² can be drawn. For example, Fig. 1
shows the relation between ∆ and ² for different values of k and v∗ = u∗, e.g., peers
sell and buy items of comparable prices. We have the following observations: if sellers
are long-term players staying in the system infinitely, the number of last ∆ transactions
plays no roles and thus any trust model with reasonably good accuracy (α, β ≤ ² < 0.5)
can be used as an effective sanctioning tool to motivate sellers’ cooperation. Otherwise, if
sellers only participate in a limited number of transactions, or in case of high k values, very
high levels of accuracy (² < 0.05) are required to reduce the parameter ∆, i.e., to ensure
cooperation of sellers in most transactions.
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Fig. 1. The relation between the upper-bound ² of misclassification errors of a computational trust model and
incentives of rational sellers to cooperate for different values of k. Rational sellers find it most beneficial to
cooperate during all but their last ∆ transactions.
Consequently, the study of the selection protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉 gives us the following ob-
servation on those sufficient conditions to use a computational trust modelR to effectively
boost cooperations among rational entities (Corollary 3.4).
COROLLARY 3.4. It is possible to use any computational trust model with misclassifi-
cation errors upper-bounded by some ² < 0.5 to effectively enforce cooperation of rational
sellers who participate infinitely or in a very large number of transactions, even in presence
of strategic rating manipulation by participants.
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Taking the rationality of peers into account, Corollary 3.4 also reveals that the key to
ensure cooperation is not the accuracy of the trust learning algorithm but on an identity
management scheme that is effective in preventing white-washing behaviors. For example,
the establishing of a new identity can be made costly so that peers want to stay for many
transactions rather than change their identities and start over. For centralized e-trading sys-
tems where trusted parties are present, a simple yet effective solution to ensure cooperation
of all rational participants even in the last ∆ transactions is to require each seller to deposit
an approximate amount ∆v∗ to the third trusted party before being able to join the system.
This deposited sum will only be returned to the sellers if it intends to quit the system and
only if it has not been detected as cheating by k or more others peers.
Corollary 3.5 shows the possibility of enforcing cooperation of rational sellers in another
case of the seller-selection protocol Sk with k = 1 in case the computational trust model
being used has errors α, β depending on the fraction of honest reporting users h.
COROLLARY 3.5. The seller-selection protocol S1 = 〈R, 1〉 makes it optimal for a ra-
tional seller to cooperate in all but its last∆ transactions, where∆ = max{1, bv∗/(u∗(1−
α−β− (β−α)h))c}, h is the overall fraction of honest raters in the system, and the trust
modelR has corresponding misclassification errors α, β such that α+β+(β−α)h < 1.
PROOF. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 with k = 1 and note that yb− xb =
1− α− β − (β − α)h.
We can also make use of another observation (Proposition 3.6).
PROPOSITION 3.6. The seller-selection protocol S1 = 〈R, 1〉 makes it optimal for a
rational seller to cooperate in the current transaction if it stays for ∆ further transactions
more, where ∆ = max{1, bv/(u∗(1−α−β− (β−α)h))c} and v is the illegitimate gain
of the seller in current transaction.
Fig. 2 shows the number of last ∆ transactions in which a rational seller might not find
the incentive to cooperate versus the probability it will be blacklisted given misclassifica-
tion errors α, β of a learning algorithm (with different values of v∗, u∗).
3.3 Incentive-compatibility of the Naive Computational Model
We want to further consider one very simple case of the naively optimistic trust model N :
a seller always trusts any rater and considers the absence of a rating as the presence of a
reliable positive one. Corollary 3.7 shows the relation between the incentive-compatibility
of such naively optimistic algorithm N and the buyer’s truthfully reporting probability h,
in case there is no strategic manipulation of ratings in the system. The seller-selection pro-
tocol 〈N , 1〉 for this special case is actually equivalent to the reputation system considering
only the last rating studied by Dellarocas [Dellarocas 2003]
COROLLARY 3.7. With the exception of strategic manipulation of ratings by a seller,
the seller-selection protocol 〈N , 1〉 makes it optimal for a rational seller to cooperate in
all transactions but its last ∆ = max{1, bv∗/(hu∗)c} ones, where h is the probability that
a buyer leaves an honest rating after a transaction. Such selection mechanism also gives
direct incentives for long-term buyers to leave truthful ratings after their transactions.
PROOF. Proceed as in the analysis of Theorem 3.2, knowing that the simple com-
putational model N has misclassification errors α = 1 and β = 0, we have δhc ≥
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Fig. 2. The relation between the accuracy of the algorithms and the incentives of a rational seller to cooperate.
Rational sellers find it most beneficial to cooperate during its whole life-time, except the last ∆ transactions.
−v∗ + ∆u∗(1 − (1 − h)) = −v∗ + ∆u∗h. Thus seller would cooperate with a buyer
if δhc ≥ 0, or ∆ ≥ v∗/(hu∗). Naturally, the above condition also gives direct incentives
for a long-staying buyer to leave a correct rating after its transaction to increase his prob-
ability value h as observed by subsequent sellers, which maximizes his chance of having
successful transactions in the future (decrease ∆ of other sellers).
The seller-selection protocol 〈N , 1〉 implements a mechanism for which buyers and sell-
ers follow a tit-for-tat strategy: who behave honestly (reports reliably or cooperates when
selling) will be rewarded accordingly. The disadvantage of such mechanism is its exclusion
of the case a seller manipulates his ratings. We expect the truthfulness reporting probabil-
ity h to be affected by preferences of a rating user and noises in his observations: whether
he wants to leave a rating and according to his erroneous evaluation of the seller behavior,
e.g., due to possible shipping delays or loss.
In the presence of (strategic) manipulation of the reports, a buyer must use a sophis-
ticated trust learning algorithm to evaluate the reliability of the rater, as presented in the
previous Section 3.2. Otherwise a selection protocol based on only the latest rating can be
attacked easily. For example, a cheating seller can collude with another buyer to immedi-
ately stuff a positive rating with newer time-stamp in the system.
Fig. 3 shows the relation between the overall probability h that a peer is a honest report-
ing peer and the number of ∆ last transactions for which sellers may not find incentives to
cooperate, with different settings of v∗ and u∗. For example, let us consider the previous
trading scenario where peers sell and buy items of comparable prices (u∗ ' v∗). If seller
is a long-term player, and the truthfully reporting probability h ' .6 (a highly vulnerable
environment), even the naive algorithm makes it optimal for a seller to behave honestly for
most of his transactions (except the last one).
It is important to note that Theorem 3.2 and its corollaries (Corollary 3.5 and 3.7) state
those sufficient, not necessary conditions for a trust learning algorithm to be incentive-
compatible. In general, there maybe other designs better than the proposed selection mech-
anism Sk.
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Fig. 3. The relation between the truthful reporting rate h and the number of last transactions during which sellers
have no incentive to cooperate in case buyers use the selection algorithm 〈N , 1〉.
4. COST-EFFICIENT REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
4.1 Implementation Cost of Computational Trust Models
Accurate computational trust models are costly to build and to maintain. Several sources
may contribute to the cost of such computational mechanism, as summarized in Defini-
tion 4.1.
Definition 4.1. The implementation cost of a computational trust model 〈Pi, Vi,Fj , A,D〉
(Definition 2.1) consists of the following component cost:
• communication cost τc to explore the peers Pi and retrieve relevant ratings Vi.
• computation cost τe of the algorithmA and decision making algorithmD to aggregate,
analyze ratings and make appropriate decisions.
• possible monetary cost τm: since reliable ratings can be considered as sellable goods
offered by third-party monitoring agents in the system, buying them incurs certain
cost. This cost may also include the payment for participants in system with any side-
payment mechanism to elicit truthful reporting behaviors [Miller et al. 2005].
• storage cost τs to store and to maintain rating information and historical performance
of potential partners/raters.
• hidden/opportunity cost τo: time-consuming learning algorithms may lead to late de-
cisions and hence is considered as more costly than fast algorithms, especially in com-
petitive scenarios.
A detailed study of the cost model of each computational model is much dependent on
the system and application on which we apply the algorithm. For example, the estimation
of opportunity cost τo during the lifetime of a peer is non-trivial, though it maybe signifi-
cant. Such a thorough study of all cost types of existing algorithms is out of the scope of
the paper. In this work we only focus on the most obvious and measurable cost of com-
munication τc. Evaluations of such communication cost τc of well-known trust learning
algorithms will be presented in Section 6.
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4.2 Cost-effective Usage of a Computational Trust Model
This section studies the cost and benefits of using different trust learning algorithms and
investigates the possibilities of minimizing the cost while still maintaining a high level of
cooperation in the system. While an algorithm with better accuracy is generally preferable
(see Theorem 3.2), it usually comes with higher cost. For instance, an algorithm relying on
the retrieval/buying reliable information from trusted third-party agents may give us more
accurate information about the sellers, yet it is apparently more expensive than a simple
averaging algorithm (Example 2.3).
Consider the case a buyer can choose either a computational trust model R1 or another
model R2 to evaluate the trustworthiness of a rating. Suppose that R1 is an accurate
algorithm with misclassification errors α1 = α, β1 = β, both upper-bounded by some
² < 0.5, and with an expected cost C1. A typical example of R1 is to buy information
from some third-party monitoring agents to get correct estimate of the behavior of the last
buyer/rater. Let R2 be the simple computational trust model N (always trusts all ratings)
with errors α2 = 1, β2 = 0, and negligible cost C2 ¿ C1. The cost C1, C2 may compose of
certain component cost in Definition 4.1.
On one hand, since α, β are less than ² ≤ 0.5, the computational model R1 can be
used to motivate the cooperation of a seller in most transactions (Theorem 3.2), yet this
approach is costly to deploy. On the other hand, it is impossible to use only the naive trust
model R2 = N for the same purpose since the seller can strategically manipulate ratings
easily, e.g., by colluding with others to submit biased ratings. However, this use of the trust
model N is, less costly, and thus more preferable.
In this scenario, our approach is to let a buyer use the computational model R1 with
probability c and modelR2 with probability 1−c. Theorem 4.2 proposes a way to optimize
the cost of using expensive computational modelR1 while still ensuring cooperation in the
system.
THEOREM 4.2. Consider the selection protocol S1 = 〈R, 1〉, in which the dishonesty
detector R is implemented by using the trust model R1 with probability c and the naively
model N with probability 1 − c. The seller finds it optimal to cooperate in all but its
last ∆ transactions, where ∆ = max{1, b v∗u∗(1−2²)c}, under the condition that c ≥ c∗ =
v∗
δu∗(1−2²) , where δ ≥ ∆ is the number of remaining transactions of the rational seller.
This result holds in presence of strategic manipulations of ratings.
PROOF. According to Theorem 3.2 (k=1), using only the algorithm R1 can ensure co-
operations of a rational seller in all transactions but its last ∆ > max{1, b v∗u∗(1−2²)c} ones.
Let δ ≥ ∆ be the number of remaining transactions of the seller at the current step.
Proceed as in Theorem 3.2 with k = 1, α′ = cα1 + (1 − c)α2 = 1 − c + cα, and
β′ = cβ1+(1−c)β2 = cβ, we get δhc ≥ −v∗+δu∗(h(1−c)+c(1−α−β−(β−α)h)).
Since 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, it follows that α + β + (β − α)h ≤ α + β + max {β − α, 0} ≤
2max {β, α} ≤ 2². Thus, h(1− c) + c(1−α− β− (β−α)h) ≥ c(1− 2²) for c ∈ [0, 1].
This makes δhc ≥ −v∗ + δu∗c(1− 2²).
Therefore, δhc ≥ 0, or being cooperation is a dominant strategy for the provider if and
only if c ≥ c∗ = v∗δu∗(1−2²)
Fig. 4 shows the minimal probability c∗ of using the expensive trust model R1 depend-
ing on the estimated remaining transactions δ of the seller, with u∗ = v∗ and ² = 0.35. In
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case most sellers staying in the system infinitely or long enough, the mix of two compu-
tational trust models help to reduce the total implementation cost significantly, as shown
in Corollary 4.3. The cost of using only one expensive trust model is, on the other hand,
much higher O(C1N).
COROLLARY 4.3. In case most sellers staying in the system infinitely or long enough,
the mix of two computational trust models as in Theorem 4.2 has an expected accumulative
implementation cost O(C1log(N)), where a seller stays in the system for N transactions.
PROOF. Since the cost of the naive model N is negligible, we can estimate the to-
tal accumulative implementation cost of the mixed approach in Theorem 4.2 as C(N) =
C1 v∗u∗(1−2²)
∑N
δ=∆
1
δ , where N is the number of transactions of rational sellers.
Since limN→∞
∑N
δ=1
1
δ − logN = γ, where γ = 0.577... is the Euler-Mascheroni
constant, it follows that C(N) is O(C1logN), which is significantly lower than the imple-
mentation cost O(C1N) of using only the expensive trust model R1.
Hence, given the rationality of participants, the accurate computational trust algorithm
R1 mostly plays the role of a sanctioning tool rather than the role of learning trustworthi-
ness of potential partners.
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Fig. 4. The minimal necessary probability c∗ to use the expensive algorithm R1 depending on the number of
remaining transactions δ of a rational seller for ² = 0.35, u∗ = v∗.
5. USING REPUTATION INFORMATION IN DYNAMIC SCENARIOS
The above analysis shows that if rational peers staying in the system infinitely, cooperation
is ensured relatively easily. Based on the above results, this section proposes a seller-
selection protocol for rational buyers that ensures cooperation of rational sellers for most
transactions in the dynamic scenarios, where peers can join and leave dynamically after a
number of transactions.
We assume in such dynamic scenarios, the following information is global knowledge
of all peers: first, the distribution of life-time of sellers, which is observable and learnable
to all peers. Second, peers know misclassification errors α, β of the learning algorithm R
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being used. These errors may depend on the overall rate of honest reporting users h. In
fact, α, β and h can be learnt from the own experience of each peer.
Rational peers can only use all available information and behave strategically to max-
imize their long-term benefits. Thus, a rational buyer has to make decision based on the
expected number of remaining transactions of each candidate seller.
We approximate the algorithm for a rational (strategic) buyer to select a seller before
each transaction as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 selectSeller(candidate sellers set S, algorithmR, globalBlacklist L): seller s
1: EligibleSellers = ∅;
2: for each s ∈ S do
3: if s ∈ L then
4: continue;
5: end if
6: Measure the overall rate of honest reporting peers h;
7: Get misclassification errors α, β of algorithmR for current h;
8: Estimate benefit u∗ and current cheating gain v of s;
9: ∆min = max{1, b vu∗(1−α−β−(β−α)h) c};
10: p[s] = Pr[seller s stays at least ∆min further transactions];
11: Get binary rating ri by peer i on the latest transaction of s;
12: Run R to evaluate the reliability (binary trust) ti of ri.
13: if ri == ti then
14: EligibleSellers = EligibleSellers ∪ {s, p[s]};
15: else
16: Report to add s to the global blacklist L;
17: end if
18: end for
19: Select a seller s from EligibleSellers with probability p(s)/
∑
s p(s);
Algorithm 1 follows description of the seller-selection protocol S1 = 〈R, 1〉 in Defini-
tion 2.5 with some modifications. Practically, cautious buyers can simply use measured
values of α, β in worst case scenarios (their upper-bound ²) instead of estimating the hon-
est reporting rate h and measure those errors α, β (lines 6 and 7). Other quantities can
be obtained easily. For example, in an e-trading system, the minimal legal benefit u∗ of
a seller is the minimal value of an item accepted for trading in the system. The gain v
is the value of the current resource plus the shipping cost announced by the seller. ∆min
is the minimal number of remaining transactions that a rational seller finds incentives to
cooperate for the current level of α, β, and h (see Proposition 3.6). Since we assume that
the distribution of number of transactions by sellers can be learnt from their trading history
in the system, it is trivial to estimate the probability p[s] that a seller stays in ∆min further
transactions. This probability can be seen approximately the probability that this strategic
seller cooperates in the current transaction compared and thus is used as a selection criteria
(line 19).
According to the above analysis (Proposition 3.6), the best strategies of rational sellers
are described as in Algorithm 2. That is, a strategic seller will cooperate in all transaction
except its last ∆ ones, also considering current rate of honest reporting h in the system.
Similar to a buyer, the seller estimates its ∆ parameter based on the global knowledge
of misclassification errors α, β of the learning algorithm being used, its current temporal
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gain v and minimal legal benefit u∗ at each step. Note that the values of ∆ and ∆∗ in
Algorithm 2 are more accurate than the client-estimated ∆min in Algorithm 1 since a
seller generally knows all of its v, u and its total number of transactions.
Algorithm 2 bestServingStrategy(alg R): servingStrategy
1: Measure the overall rate of honest reporting h;
2: Get misclassification errors α, β of alg. R for current h level;
3: Estimate the minimal own benefit u∗ and cheating gain v;
4: ∆∗ = max{1, b vu∗(1−α−β−(β−α)h) c}; /* estimate what the buyer estimates*/
5: Estimate my remaining number of transactions ∆;
6: if ∆ ≥ ∆∗ then
7: Return good;
8: else
9: Return bad;
10: end if
Using the above seller-selection protocol, the number of successful transactions, or co-
operation level, in the system generally depends on how accurate buyers can estimate the
number of remaining transactions of a seller in order to select the right one still having
incentives to cooperate. More concretely, a strategic seller is motivated to cooperate if
∆min ≥ ∆∗.
The algorithm for a strategic buyer to use a mix of two algorithms R and N to select
a seller (Theorem 4.2) is then implemented as follows. A buyer estimates the number of
remaining transaction δbuyer of a seller from expected number of transactions of all sellers
in the system. Next, it computes the minimal probability cbuyer = vδbuyeru∗(1−2²) it needs
to use R in the current transaction. On the other hand, the best thing a strategic seller can
do is to also estimate those values cbuyer , δbuyer , and computes the minimal probability
cseller = v∆u∗(1−2²) for its remaining number of transactions ∆. The seller cooperates
only if it stays more than ∆ > ∆∗ and cbuyer ≥ cseller .
Since it is very difficult to perform a rigorous analysis on the peer cooperation in such
dynamic scenarios with various possible parameters of the join and leave processes of
peers, we defer the measurement and analysis of cooperations later on (Section 6), where
extensive simulations with various input parameters obtained from real case studies are
performed for such analysis purposes.
6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
6.1 Simulation Framework
We use our generic trust prototyping and simulation framework8 as the simulation tool for
all experiments. This tool enables the rapid development and testing of many trust compu-
tational models under a variety of environment settings. Particularly, new algorithms for
peers and appropriate performance metrics can be easily defined and integrated into the
framework without major efforts.
Fig. 5 shows an overall architectural view of our simulation and prototyping framework,
which is composed of the following modular components. PeerApplication layer is an
8http://lsirpeople.epfl.ch/lhvu/download/repsim/
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Fig. 5. Architecture of the trust prototyping and simulation framework
abstraction of the P2P application to be simulated. Such application is defined as an inter-
action scenario where peers provide or obtain resources of different prices and quality to
and from the others. This abstraction makes it possible to tweak our system to simulate a
range of similar applications, e.g., a C2C trading scenario, or a market of services, with the
least efforts.
The TrustManagement layer serves as a trust management subsystem supporting peers
in modeling and learning trustworthiness of other targets, as well as supporting them in
their trust-based decision making processes. We provide standard APIs and many basic
building blocks for users to develop and plug-in many computational trust (learning) mod-
els and decision making algorithms into the simulation without major efforts.
Another immediate layer, the ServiceSupport layer, encapsulates the distributed infor-
mation storage, retrieval, and routing mechanisms being used. Particularly, this layer pro-
vides upper-layers with capabilities of sending requests and receiving responses among
the peers, as well as searching and retrieving information on resources and related ratings
on them for the trust computation. This layer helps separating the trust management sub-
system from the underlying identity handling, searching, retrieving of information mech-
anisms, and thus facilitating the integrating and testing of a certain trust management ap-
proach on top of different distributed information management schemes.
The SimulatedNetwork layer represents the underlying communication network, which
can be implemented as a centralized or decentralized system depending on the system be-
ing simulated. Since we only emphasize on the simulation and study of social and strategic
behavior of peers in the application layer for a certain trust management approach, we only
provide a basic implementation of this layer. Specifically, the layer is implemented as a
network of nodes with latencies among them following the King latency data set [Gum-
madi et al. 2002], where of peers join and leave the system according to a realistic churn
model [Stutzbach and Rejaie 2006]. In fact, our system can be configured to use other mes-
sage passing protocols or underlying communication networks with any latency models as
needed, besides the default implementation.
The SimulationManager takes care of all back-end supports for the simulation, e.g.,
capturing, inspecting, controlling, and collection of measured data in both interactive and
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batch modes. We use RePastJ9 as the base to develop this component, as this library pro-
vides several useful tools to help in setting up of the environments, dynamic controlling
peer’s parameters, performing visualization, and collecting simulation results, etc. Again,
the modular designed and well-specified APIs of the SimulationManager layer makes it
possible to use the system with other simulation libraries. In fact, we can provide a decen-
tralized implementation of this layer to support larger-scale simulations or even emulate
an application behavior on a real network via the help of real users. Fig. 6 shows some
screenshots of our prototyping and simulation framework in actions, whose further details
can be found online10.
Fig. 6. Screenshots of the trust prototyping and simulation framework in GUI (interactive) mode. The system can
be used to simulate interactions and cooperation among peers in different application scenarios by implementing
a peer to provide appropriate services. Users can configure various settings of the environments (right panel)
such as fraction of peers with different behaviors, trust computational models to be used. The trust relationships
among peers are shown in the network of the top-left panel, where one can inspect and change behavior of certain
peers during simulation time interactively, e.g., the screenshot honest participants are blue peers with many trust
relationships. System performance over time is shown in the bottom-left panel. Most simulation settings such as
distribution of different peer types with various behaviors and definitions of (new) system performance metrics
can be done programmatically via provided APIs to facilitate the collection and detailed analysis of experimental
results.
6.2 Simulation Setting
We verify our theoretical analysis and its practical application in the example C2C trad-
ing scenario with the above prototyping and simulation framework. The details on the
9http://repast.sourceforge.net
10http://lsirpeople.epfl.ch/lhvu/download/repsim/
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modeling, implementation, and configuration files for all experiments in this paper are
available11.
Peers are modeled as sellers and/or buyers of many items and exhibit different behaviors.
Cooperation level and accumulated utilities of different peer types who sell and buy goods
of different prices are then measured and analyzed under various simulations settings: first,
peers can leave and join dynamically, thus having different number of transactions during
their lifetime. Second, buyers use different computational trust models with different per-
sonalized inputs and settings to evaluate the rating trustworthiness of others. Third, peers
exhibit several behaviors, both irrationally malicious and/or strategic, details to be pre-
sented in coming sections. To more accurately model the delay of information propagation
in the network, we implement the routing of messages so that the search cost in the system
similar to that of a logarithmic P2P routing overlay, i.e., it takes time O(logn) to lookup a
data item in system with n peers. The latencies among nodes in the network are set up with
the King-latency data set provided by [Gummadi et al. 2002], which measured the real la-
tencies between nodes in the Internet. The dynamic joins and leaves of peers in the system
are simulated according to statistics from real-life case studies on many live peer-to-peer
systems [Stutzbach and Rejaie 2006]. Specifically, we schedule the inter-arrival time of
peers to follow a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 0.53, and generate the up-time
of peers to follow a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 0.34 [Stutzbach and Rejaie
2006]. The scaling parameters of these Weibull distributions are set so that all peers live
long enough to send and receive many messages during their up-time. We then compute
the number of transactions a seller participates from its up time by using a scaling factor
K. K is set such that those peers with up-time approximating the mean of the overall
uptime distributions participate in µtrans transactions, where µtrans is a parameter of the
simulation.
6.3 Implementation of Peer Behaviors
Since it is impossible to implement full rationality, in our simulation rational peers are
approximated as strategic ones who use all available information to find a most beneficial
strategy for them at each step. A (strategic) buyer first searches for the available goods
satisfying its requirements and then selects one according to Algorithm 1 and its variant
introduced previously in Section 5.
A good seller ships the good after receiving the payment with a very high probability
(γ+ = 0.99 ) of satisfying the buyer and get a good rating. A bad seller either doesn’t
ship the good or ship a low quality item to the buyer, resulting in a very low probability
(γ− ≈ 0.05) of meeting buyer’s anticipation and thus likely to get a bad rating afterwards.
Other sellers are strategic and use all available information to find the best strategy to
follow, e.g., whether it should ship the item or not, so as to maximize its long-term utilities,
following the best strategies described in Algorithm 2 (Section 5).
Regarding rating behaviors, peers consist of the following types: honest (always reports
correctly about what it has observed), badmouthing (always reports negatively), advertis-
ing (always reports positively), ignoring (does not report), and strategic. Strategic raters
can provide correct, incorrect ratings or does not leave any rating depending on each sit-
uation.To reduce the complexity of the simulation, in this paper we have to limit rating
behavior of strategic peers to the following safe strategy. When asked by an unknown peer
11http://lsirpeople.epfl.ch/lhvu/download/repsim/
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Table II. Experimental settings of representative simulation scenarios with different types
of sellers and buyers. Seller types consist of: s% strategic, g% good, and b% bad. There
are five rater types modeled: h% honest, sr% strategic, a% advertising, b% badmouthing,
the rest are those peers leaving no reports after a transaction. We set a > b since
advertising behaviors are generally popular than badmouthing behaviors in most case
studies of current reputation-enabled systems.
Scenario s g b h sr a b Result
C1. No strategic sellers, most seller bad 0 15 85 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 7
C2. No strategic sellers, half seller good 0 50 50 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 7
C3. No strategic sellers, most seller good 0 85 15 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 7
C4. Few sellers strategic, most bad 10 5 85 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 8
C5. Most sellers strategic 85 5 10 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 8
C6. Different seller types 33 34 33 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 8, 9
C7. All sellers strategic 100 0 0 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 10
on the trustworthiness of a trusted, a blacklisted, or an unknown partner, a strategic peer
respectively reports positively, negatively, or honestly. When asked by a trusted peer about
trustworthiness of another peer, the strategic peer always reports honestly. Requests from
blacklisted peers are ignored. This reporting strategy is chosen for many reasons. First, the
cost of reporting after a transaction in our current application is negligible. Second, this
strategy helps peers to rapidly build up and extend its trust relationships with many other
peers in the system, thus intuitively most beneficial to them.
Settings of each experiment and corresponding result of the experiment are summarized
in Table II. We simulate the system in most cases with dynamically leaves and joins of
peers, starting with n = 256 peers. In convergence the number of peers approximately
double this initial number with our churn model. We were able to run our simulation with
up to 1024 initial peers, and the results are similar. Each simulation is run until convergence
and the measured outputs are averaged over 10 different runs.
6.4 Accuracy of Example Computational Trust Models
We implemented three computational trust models and used each of them in our simulation
to evaluate the reliability of a rater. We then combine each of them with the naive algorithm
N to estimate the total saved cost as proposed by Theorem 4.2. The first computation
model L is the PeerTrust PSM/DTC algorithm proposed by Xiong and Liu [Xiong and
Liu 2004], presented earlier in Example 2.2. With this algorithm, a peer i estimates the
trustworthiness of another rater j based on the similarity between i’s and j’s ratings on
some other sellers which both i and j have contacted with. The second algorithm X is a
the maximum likelihood estimation-based learning algorithm as in Example 2.3. A peer
i estimates the probability that a rater j is trustworthy so as to maximize the likelihood
of getting the current set of ratings from i and j on those sellers both have experienced
with. We also implemented a dishonesty detectorAwith reasonably good misclassification
errors: both α, β are less than ² = 0.1, and with a high cost of each time being used.
In practice, a peer can implement this detector by asking for information from the third
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party monitoring or consulting agents before buying things. The dishonesty detector A
simulates a global trust learning algorithm and is used to verify the relation between the
learning accuracy and the cooperation level in the system with peers having the same input
when learning the reliability of raters. The two algorithms L and X are used to test the
efficiency of the seller-selection protocol in a more relaxed environment where peers use
different algorithms with personalized inputs and settings to estimate rating behaviors. For
the sake of readability, in the following experiments we only show the results for algorithm
L. The results for algorithm X are close to those of L, where as the results of A are even
better. The used of other global trust learning models like complain-based trust [Aberer
and Despotovic 2001] or EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] in place of the algorithm A is
subject to our future work.
As a base for other experiments, we first estimate the overall misclassification errors
α, β of those implemented trust learning algorithms L and X under a variety of scenarios,
depending on the fraction of honest reporting users h in the system. The most representa-
tive scenarios C1, C2, and C3 for this experimentation identified in Table II are based on
two observations. First, it is not necessary to measure precisely the accuracy of a learning
algorithm but only the overall trend and worst case misclassification errors α, β depending
on the percentage of honest reporting peers h in the system. Secondly, strategic selling
behaviors can be excluded when estimating these misclassification errors for the reason
that learning uses only historical data, and outcome of these strategic behaviors can be
assumed to follow one of the overall trend discovered by three above extreme cases. We
measure these statistics under three cases where there are different fraction of good and
bad sellers in the systems (scenarios C1, C2, and C3 in Table II). To increase readabil-
ity, we show only the highest misclassification error values of α, β for each algorithm in
our experiments. Note that such robustness or accuracy of these algorithms have already
been extensively studied in related work [Despotovic and Aberer 2004; Xiong and Liu
2004], most of which having been shown to have low α, β under various attack scenarios.
Therefore, the goal of our simulation here is just to confirm these expectations and to get
statistics of these errors for later experiments.
Fig. 7 shows estimated maximal values of α, β of the learning algorithm L based on
PeerTrust PSM/DTC approach proposed by Xiong and Liu [Xiong and Liu 2004] for the
mean number of transactions µtrans = 50 in three extreme cases C1, C2, C3 of Table II.
Generally, the accuracy of L is highest where most peers staying in the system longer
(µtrans = 50) and in less malicious environments (higher levels of honest reporters and
good sellers), as we expected. These max{α, β} statistics are then used in our later exper-
iments as global knowledge of all strategic peers, where we also observe the same trend of
these accuracy statistics.
We tested with different values of µtrans and observed that when most peers only par-
ticipate in very few transactions (µtrans < 10), the trust learning algorithm can not collect
enough historical data for accurate learning, resulting in high errors α, β > 0.5 and thus
our approach is not applicable.
6.5 Cooperation in Various Environments
The levels of cooperation in the system with different fractions of strategic sellers and
raters are given in Fig. 8 for µtrans = 50 (cases C4, C5, C6 of Table II). The case of
all strategic sellers shows even a better trend. We also perform experiments with other
extreme cases, e.g., all sellers, buyers, and raters strategic, yet the results are similar and
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Fig. 7. The misclassification errors of algorithm L in three cases with different fraction of bad sellers and mali-
cious raters, i.e., scenarios C1, C2, C3 of Table II with µtrans = 50.
thus are not given here. For small µtrans < 10 the cooperation drops significantly, as the
learning has no values at all.
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Fig. 8. Relation between cooperation (fraction of good transactions) and accuracy of a trust learning model in
environments with mixed behaviors: honest, malicious, and strategic for µtrans = 50. Cooperation is very high
since the learning accuracy is good.
In case there are many types of rating and serving behaviors (cases C4, C5, C6 of Ta-
ble II), the accumulated utilities of rational peers, following the serving strategies designed
by the theoretical analysis (cooperate in all transactions except the last ∆ ones), are gen-
erally the highest among different types. Representative result is shown in Fig. 9 with
comparable number of peers with different types. Herein utilities are measured in terms of
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accumulate gains (the price of an item is approx 10 units). In fact, utilities of strategic sell-
ers are approximate to those of good ones, since strategic peers are enforced to cooperate
most of their life. Our proposed approach still works even with dynamic joins and leaves
of peers in the system, given that most peers stay in the system long enough (µtrans > 10
in our simulation).
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Fig. 9. Utilities of different types of sellers in a scenario with comparable number of peers with different types:
malicious peers are quickly detected and blacklisted, thus bad sellers have very low life-time payoff. Utilities of
strategic sellers are highest and approximate to that of good sellers, since they are enforced to cooperate in most
of their transactions.
In case of all strategic peers, we can also use a combination of algorithms to minimize
the total learning cost (as in Theorem 4.2). Fig. 10 compares the cost of two approaches:
the first one uses only the algorithm L, the second uses L with a low probability. It is
interesting to see that the learning cost can be reduced significantly by using the expensive
algorithm a very low probability while still maintaining a high level of cooperation in the
system. Furthermore, the approach M using the combination of two algorithms learns
faster and thus during the same simulation time, the total number of good transactions in
the whole system is also much higher.
7. RELATED WORK
A large number of work in trust research literature focus on developing appropriate com-
putational models for learning peer behaviors based on their historical performance infor-
mation, for example [Levien 2002; Kamvar et al. 2003; Srivatsa et al. 2005; Xiong and
Liu 2004]. Comparative surveys of research literature on this subject can be found else-
where [Golbeck 2006; Jøsang et al. 2005; Dellarocas 2005b; Despotovic and Aberer 2006].
Such computational models have been shown to be robust under various attack scenarios.
These work are complementary to what we are doing, since any robust and accurate com-
putational learning models can be used in our reputation-based peer selection protocol (c.f.
Section 4).
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Fig. 10. Comparison the learning cost between two approaches: (L) is the use of a single algorithm L, and (M)
the mix of algorithm L and the naive algorithm N . Herein, we measure the cost of the learning algorithm as
the number of sent and received messages for a good transaction. Though both approaches have very high level
cooperation (same as in Fig. 8), the second one has a significantly lower cost.
Our work is inspired by that of Dellarocas [Dellarocas 2003], which studies various de-
sign parameters of reputation mechanisms. Some conclusions in his paper coincide with
the analysis in our work, e.g., the robustness of the naively optimistic algorithm (Sec-
tion 3.3). However, in this paper we have considered many more aspects of a reputation-
based computational trust model, namely its accuracy and cost, from which we have ob-
tained other promising results. We have proposed a way to use such a computational
model in an incentive-compatible and cost-efficient way, as well as performed empirical
experimental studies of reputation effects on strategic agents in decentralized and dynamic
environments. Our cost-efficient reputation management solution in Section 4 is an appli-
cation of inspection game theory [Avenhaus et al. 2002], wherein an accurate yet expen-
sive trust learning algorithm plays the role of an inspector detecting dishonest behaviors of
sellers who take the role of an inspectee of the game. To the best of our knowledge, this
work is the first work to apply inspection game in reputation systems. The most related
work to our cost-effective reputation management approach is [Agrawal and Terzi 2006],
yet it addresses another problem of how to control the behaviors of agents in a central-
ized sovereign information sharing scenario. They propose to use an auditing device as
a trusted centralized agent and decide the appropriate frequency of auditing. The notion
of punishment amount and frequency are similar to our notion of probability to use the
accurate and expensive algorithm in our selection algorithm. In fact, our work proposes an
effective usage of reputation information that is applicable to a wider range of applications
with different degrees of centralization.
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Many interesting observations can be derived from our previous analysis. First of all, by
showing that there exist certain sufficient conditions for a computational trust model to be
effective in enforcing cooperation, we provide an initial positive answer to the question
whether existing trust learning algorithms in the literature produce the same effects in in-
ducing the social optimum point of the system, where rational participants fully cooperate
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with each other. It also implies that in a heterogeneous environment where peers use dif-
ferent learning algorithms with certain accuracy to learn trustworthiness of their potential
partners, cooperation also emerges.
Secondly, depending on the presence of rationality from participant of the scenario be-
ing studied, either simple or sophisticated trust learning algorithms is appropriate: in en-
vironments with fully rational peers caring about their utilities, very simple algorithms are
sufficient to stimulate cooperations in the system. In other scenarios where bad peers have
the only goal of bringing the system down at any cost, sophisticated learning algorithms
are still necessary to filter out malicious agents.
Our seller-selection protocol is based on the following ideas: to use a trust learning algo-
rithm to evaluate the reliability of a most recent report on a seller. Such algorithm play the
role of an inspector to detect only past malicious behaviors of raters and sellers. By intro-
ducing a simple selection protocol that punishes bad peers, we create a social-controlling
mechanism to stimulate cooperations of rational peers in next transactions. This is differ-
ent from other systems that mainly use sophisticated learning algorithms to predict future
peer performance from the past. The inclusion of well-tested learning algorithms with
high accuracy to filter out malicious partners in our solution helps it to perform well even
in mixed environments with various malicious and rational behaviors. To a larger extent,
our presented protocol establishes an umbrella framework to use reputation information
effectively by exploiting both its sanctioning and signaling roles [Dellarocas 2005a] in
decentralized and self-organized systems.
However, our analysis also has limitations. First, the results from the previous sections
are the best outcome obtained from the equilibrium state of the system. In reality, behav-
iors of peers (buyers/sellers) may deviate from that outcome during the operation of the
system, e.g., due to bounded rationality and limited availability of information. The sec-
ond point is that in realistic peer-to-peer networks, peers can join and leave dynamically.
Such dynamics of the system may encourage peers to milk their gained reputation, leave,
and then rejoin the system under new identities. Our analysis shows that sellers may still
be tempted to cheat in their last transactions or if the temporary gain v is so high compared
to normal benefits they obtain for being cooperative. Under this circumstance the approach
proposed by this paper is only an approximate solution that introduce incentives for most
players (buyers and sellers) who stay in the system long enough to be cooperative. In this
context the key to ensure cooperation is not the accuracy/errors of the trust learning algo-
rithm being used, but on the management of identities: the establishing of a new identity
must be costly so that peers want to stay in the system for many transactions rather than
changing their identities and start over. Such whitewashing behaviors can be prevented
by using many existing techniques, for example, to impose an entrant fee on newly joined
peers. For those applications where peers may get very large temporary gains for cheating,
it is very hard to design any totally decentralized incentive-based mechanism to motivate
short-term peers to be fully cooperative, and reputation information may not be an effective
tool anyway.
As of our future work, we want to derive some theoretical bounds on the cooperation
level in the system of our reputation management approach, given arrival and up-time
distributions of peers. We are also implementing various serving strategies of bounded
rational peers in our simulation framework: we assume sellers use reinforcement learning
algorithms to explore many possibilities before deriving their best serving strategies to fol-
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low. We expect that such empirical simulations give us more insights to the effectiveness
of different trust learning algorithms in enforcing cooperation and building trust in pres-
ence of bounded-rational peers with limited available information. Our ultimate goal is to
provide a “cookbook” for applications of different trust learning algorithms in open and
decentralized systems.
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